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Does the Theory of Disparate Impact Liability
Apply in Cases Arising Under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act?: A Question of
Interpretation
On December 3, 2001, the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari in the case of Adams v. Florida Power Corpora-
tion,' to decide whether the disparate impact theory of liability
should be applied to claims arising under the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act (hereinafter ADEA).' The disparate impact
theory of liability has been described by the Court as a claim that
"involves employment practices that are facially neutral in their
treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on
one group than another and cannot be justified by business neces-
sity. Proof of discriminatory motive.. .is not required under a dis-
parate-impact theory."0
This issue has caused turmoil throughout the circuit courts;
ending in a split as to whether the disparate impact theory should
be applied. The Second, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have found
that, because the language of the ADEA parallels Title VII, dispa-
rate impact claims also should be allowed under the ADEA.4 In
conflict, the viability of disparate impact claims under the ADEA
have been questioned by the First, Third, Sixth, Seventh, and
Tenth Circuits.5
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC),
through their interpretive guidelines of the ADEA, which are
given great deference, has applied disparate impact liability to
1. 122 S. Ct. 643 (2001).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 623 (2001).
3. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 609 (1993) (quoting Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n. 15 (1977).
4. Adams v. Florida Power Corporation, 255 F.3d 1322, 1324 (11' Cir. 2001). (See
Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027, 1032 (2d Cir. 1980); Smith v. City of Des Moines, 99
F.3d 1466, 1469-70 (81h Cir. 1996); E.E.O.C. v. Borden's, Inc., 724 F.2d 1390, 1394-95 (9'
Cir. 1984)).
5. Adams, 255 F.3d at 1324-25. (See Mullin v. Raytheon Co., 164 F.3d 696, 700-01 (1"
Cir. 1999); E.E.O.C. v. Francis W. Parker School, 41 F.3d 1073, 1076-77 (7' Cir. 1994); Ellis
v. United Airlines, Inc., 73 F.3d 999, 1006-07 (10h Cir. 1996); DiBiase v. Smithkline
Beecham Corp., 48 F.3d 719, 732 (3 Cir. 1995); Lyon v. Ohio Educ. Ass'n and Profl Staff
Union, 53 F.3d 135, 139 n. 5 (6 h Cir. 1995)).
773
774 Duquesne Law Review Vol. 41
ADEA claims. ' The EEOC has determined that "when an em-
ployment practice ... is claimed as a basis for different treatment
of employees ... on the grounds that it is a 'factor other than' age,
and such a practice has an adverse impact on individuals within
the protected age group and cannot be shown to be related to job
performance, such a practice is unlawful.,
7
However, an examination of the statutory language and the leg-
islative intent behind the ADEA, as well as the unduly harsh ef-
fect that applying disparate impact liability to claims of age dis-
crimination has on employers clearly establishes that the theory of
disparate impact liability has no place in the area of age discrimi-
nation claims, despite Griggs v. Duke Power Co.8 and its progeny.
The ADEA stems from the enactment of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 19649, which prohibits discrimination in the work-
place based upon race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
When first proposed, Title VII included age under the bill's protec-
tion, but when enacted, age was excluded. However, the final ver-
sion of Title VII directed the secretary of labor to "make a full and
complete study" of the factors underlying age discrimination and
its consequences."° Subsequently, a report was submitted to Con-
gress by Secretary of Labor W. Willard Wirtz, setting forth five
basic conclusions:
1. Many employers adopt specific age limits upon those they
will employ.
2. These age limitations markedly affect rights and opportuni-
ties of older workers.
3.Although age discrimination rarely is based on the sort of
animus that motivates racial, national origin, or religious dis-
crimination, it is based upon stereotypical assumptions of the
abilities of the aged, unsupported by objective facts.
4.The evidence available at the time showed that arbitrary
removal of older workers from the workplace was generally
6. Edwards v. Shalala, 64 F.3d 601, 606 (111h Cir. 1995) "An agency's interpretation of
an ambiguous provision within a statute it is authorized to implement is entitled to judicial
deference." Id.
7. 29 C.F.R. 1625.7(d) (1999).
8. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. (2001).
10. RAYMOND F. GREGORY, AGE DISCRIMINATION IN THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE: OLD
AT A YOUNG AGE 17 (2001).
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unfounded, and that, overall, the performance of the older
worker was at least as good as that of the younger worker.
5.Age discrimination is profoundly harmful in that it deprives
the national economy of the productive labor of millions of
workers and substantially increases the costs of both unem-
ployment insurance and Social Security benefits, and it in-
flicts economic and psychological injury upon workers de-
prived of the opportunity to engage in productive and satisfy-
ing occupations."
Concurring with these findings, a Congressional committee af-
firmed Wirtz's conclusions that "employers generally operated un-
der false assumptions regarding the effects of aging in older work-
ers, that these assumptions led to the common usage of age barri-
ers in the hiring process and, consequently, that a disproportion-
ate number of older workers were among the unemployed." 2
On December 16, 1967, President Johnson signed the ADEA, to
become effective June 12, 1968. The ADEA adds to the effort of
Title VII to abrogate discrimination from the American workplace.
Section 623(a) of the ADEA describes unlawful discriminatory
practices by employers. This section reads:
It shall be unlawful for an employee-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or
otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment, because of such individual's age;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of em-
ployment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, because of such individual's age; or to
reduce the wage rate of any employee in order to comply with
this Act.1
3
It is illegal, under the ADEA, for an employer to refuse to hire,
fire, or take any other negative action against an employee be-
cause of his or her age, when that person is at least the age of
11. Department of Labor, Secretary of Labor, The Older American Worker: Age Dis-
crimination in Employment (Washington D.C., 1965).
12. GREGORY, Supra note 10, at 18.
13. 29 U.S.C. § 623 (a) (2001).
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forty. 4 Under the statute, an "employer" is a "person engaged in
an industry affecting commerce who has twenty or more employ-
ees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks
in the current or proceeding calendar year: Provided, that prior to
June 30, 1968, employers having fewer than fifty employees shall
not be considered employers."'5
The language of the ADEA has been cited as similar to that of
Title VII.16 The language of Title VII, where unlawful employment
practices are defined, parallels the language of the ADEA except
where the protected classes are listed. Title VII states that it is
unlawful "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual ...
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin"," where the ADEA states it is unlawful "to fail or refuse to
hire or discharge an individual ... because of such individual's
age."'8
Although, it would be a stretch to read the phrase "because of
such individual's age" to prohibit unintentional and incidental dis-
crimination that resulted from legitimate employment decisions, 9
the United States Supreme Court construed the language of Title
VII, which is nearly identical to that of the ADEA, to create a dis-
parate impact theory of liability.0
Despite these two sections being strikingly similar, the ADEA
differs in two important respects from Title VII. First, the ADEA
contains § 623(f)(1), which allows an employer to "take any action
otherwise prohibited ... where the differentiation is based on rea-
sonable factors other than age.",21 This is a defense, not enumer-
ated under Title VII, which allows an employer to show that the
action taken was motivated, not by age, but by a reasonable alter-
native factor. This distinctive difference between Title VII and the
ADEA provides a strong backbone for the argument to preclude
disparate impact claims under the ADEA.
Second, and possibly the strongest argument for barring dispa-
rate impact analysis under the ADEA, is "the recognition that age
14. 29 U.S.C. §§621-634 (2001).
15. 29 U.S.C. § 630 (b) (2001).
16. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978) (noting that "the prohibitions of the
ADEA were derived in haec verba from Title VII,"); Compare 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) with 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
18. Supra text p. 3.
19. Ellis, 73 F.3d at 1007 (citing Hazen Paper Co., 507 U.S. at 604).
20. Griggs, 401 U.S. 424. See infra pp. 6-7.
21. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (2001).
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is a class fundamentally unlike classes protected by Title VII."22
The classes protected under Title VII, with the possible exception
of religion, are immutable.23 A person does not move from gender
to gender, or race to race, but one does move upward through the
age continuum.24 Age is not a "suspect" class, and, although abili-
ties decrease with age, the rate of decrease differs from person to
person.25 "Congress must have recognized this, and even if it did
not, impact analysis that works well with finite classes like race
and sex does not quite fit with a fluid, continuum concept such as
age."26 Disparate impact liability does not run congruent with nei-
ther the statutory language of the ADEA, nor the legislative in-
tent; however, it has been applied by various courts to claims of
age discrimination.
When a plaintiff files a claim of age discrimination, there are
two distinct claims of discrimination that courts have applied un-
der the ADEA: disparate treatment and disparate impact.
In Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins,27 the United States Supreme
Court stated:
'Disparate treatment' ... is the most easily understood type of
discrimination. The employer simply treats some people less
favorably than others because of their race, color, religion [or
other protected characteristics.] Proof of discriminatory mo-
tive is critical, although it can in some situations be inferred
from the mere fact of differences in treatment...28
Under disparate treatment, a plaintiff must show that age actu-
ally motivated an employer's decision.29 The language of the
ADEA makes it clear that disparate treatment is the only valid
theory of liability. ° The action by the employer must have oc-
22. Mark A. Player, Wards Cove Packing or Not Wards Cove Packing? That is not the
Question: Some Thoughts on Impact Analysis Under the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 819, 829 (1997).





27. 507 U.S. 604 (1993).
28. Id. at 609.
29. Id.
30. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). "It shall be unlawful for an employer ... to fail or refuse to
hire or to discharge any individual of otherwise discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's age." Id. (emphasis added).
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curred because of a person's age. This plain language of the stat-
ute embraces intent as an element of a violation. For example,
"[an] employer who decided to resolve its financial problems by
firing older workers because they have higher salaries is likely to
be found guilty of age discrimination."31 Age was a motivating fac-
tor for dismissing the older workers, and because of the statutory
language of the ADEA, disparate treatment would be applied and
the employer would be held liable.
The disparate impact theory of liability, on the other hand, "in-
volves employment practices that are facially neutral in their
treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on
one group than another and cannot be justified by business neces-
sity. Proof of discriminatory motive ... is not required under a dis-
parate impact theory."32 The appreciable difference in the two
theories is proof of intent. With disparate impact, as compared to
disparate treatment, intent need not be proven. "A prima facie
case of discriminatory impact may be established by showing that
an employer's facially neutral practice has a disparate impact
upon members of the plaintiffs class."3 For this, the plaintiff
"must offer statistical evidence of a kind and degree sufficient to
show that the practice in question has caused the exclusion of ap-
plicants for jobs or promotion because of their membership in a
protected group."34 The burden then shifts to the employer who
"may defend by showing that the employment practice is justified
by business necessity or need and is related to successful perform-
ance of the job for which the practice is used."35 "In that event the
plaintiff must be given an opportunity to show that other selection
methods having less discriminatory effects would serve the em-
ployer's legitimate interest in competent performance of the job."6
An example of disparate impact is demonstrated when a com-
pany invokes a reduction in force (RIF), providing either voluntary
or involuntary termination, which unintentionally, but adversely
affects workers over the age of forty.37 For instance, company A is
having financial troubles and decides to eliminate a large portion
31. GREGORY, Supra note 10, at 34.
32. Supra note 3.
33. Geller, 635 F.2d at 1032.
34. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994-95 (1988).
35. Geller, 635 F.2d at 1032.
36. Id.
37. GREGORY, Supra note 10, at 34.
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of their higher salaried employees to cut cost.38 Unfortunately
70% of the higher salaried workers are over the age of forty. Al-
though, financial difficulty, not age, was the motivating factor be-
hind the RIF, company A could be found to have violated the
ADEA, if disparate impact liability were to be available. 9 This
would be unfair to employers making decisions based on economic
hardship, a rather common occurrence in today's economy.
In combating a situation as described above, section 623(f)(1) of
the ADEA ° allows an employer to show that the otherwise unlaw-
ful activity was motivated by reasonable factor other than age.
This is an affirmative defense specifically enumerated in the
ADEA. This defense directly conflicts with the disparate impact
theory of liability. Using the example from above, company A
dismissed the workers, not because of age, but to alleviate the fi-
nancial hardship by eliminating the higher salaried workers. I
submit that this is a "reasonable factor other than age," but unfor-
tunately, a court applying the disparate impact theory would
likely hold company A in violation of the ADEA, even though age
was not a motivating factor.
The United States Supreme Court has clearly applied the dispa-
rate impact theory of liability to actions under Title VII in Griggs
v. Duke Power Co.4 Griggs involved a policy of Duke Power Co.
that required a high school education and the passing of two pro-
fessionally prepared aptitude tests in order to work in any de-
partment other than Labor. A group of incumbent Negroes filed
suit alleging racial discrimination based on these requirements,
which rendered ineligible a markedly disproportionate number of
Negroes from jobs other than labor.
The Griggs Court began their analysis by determining Con-
gress's purpose in enacting Title VII. The Court stated:
The objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII is
plain from the language of the statute. It was to achieve
equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers
that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group
of white employees over other employees. Under the Act,
practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even
neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they oper-
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (2001).
41. 401 U.S. 424.
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ate to "freeze" the status quo of prior discriminatory employ-
42ment practices.
Justice Burger, writing for the majority, further states that the
lack of discriminatory intent is irrelevant, "Congress directed the
thrust of the Act to the consequences of employment practices, not
simply the motivation." 3 The majority explained, "Congress has
placed on the employer the burden of showing that any given re-
quirement must have a manifest relationship to the employment
in question." 4 The Griggs Court concluded that the general test-
ing and the requirement of a high school diploma had no relation
to job performance in this situation.4" The majority held that
these requirements violated Title VII, even though no discrimina-
tory intent was found. By doing so, the Griggs Court set the stage
for applying the theory of disparate impact liability to Title VII
actions, as well as erroneously applying it to actions under the
ADEA.
The issue of whether disparate impact liability should apply to
actions under the ADEA has been a major cause of confusion
throughout the circuit courts. The 2nd, 8th, and 9 th Circuits have
answered this question in the affirmative, relying desperately on
the holding in Griggs, and interpreting this holding to allow dis-
parate impact claims to be brought under the ADEA, based on the
similar language of the Title VII and the ADEA.
The theory of disparate impact liability was first applied to the
ADEA, by the 2nd Circuit, in the case of Geller v. Markham."6  In
Geller, the plaintiff was a 55 year old woman, hired to fill a "sud-
den opening" in the Bugbee School on September 3, 1976. 7 Two
weeks later, on September 17, plaintiff was replaced by a 25 year
old woman who had not applied for the job until September 10.48
Plaintiff proceeded to bring suit alleging violations of the ADEA,
and "pointing in particular to the 'Sixth Step Policy' adopted by
the West Hartford Board of Education.
42. Id. at 429-30.
43. Id. at 432.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 433.
46. 635 F.2d 1027.
47. Id. at 1030. Ms. Geller ("plaintiff') was a tenured teacher with a great deal of ex-
perience when she applied for this permanent position. She was told to be ready to begin
teaching on September 7, however, interviews were still being conducted at this time for
possible job candidates. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. This policy was a cost-cutting policy which stated that:
Vol. 41780
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At trial, the plaintiff introduced an expert witness who testified
that 92.6% of Connecticut teachers within the protected class of
the ADEA (between 40 and 65 years of age) have more than five
years experience, putting them within the sixth step of the salary
schedule, while only 62% of teachers under 40 years old taught
more than five years." The defendant offered two lines of defense.
First, the defendants contended that, although the "sixth step"
policy appeared to be strongly correlated to membership in the
protected class, the policy did not result in discrimination because
the percentage of teachers within the protected class hired to fill
job openings before and after the application of the policy were
about the same.5 This defense failed based upon the fact that the
statistics were compounded by a non-expert, named defendant
with an interest in the outcome of the case.5" Therefore, the dis-
trict court afforded this argument no weight and found that the
"sixth step" policy was discriminatory as a matter of law, based on
the statistics presented and the high correlation between experi-
ence and membership in the protected age group."
The second defense presented was that the policy was a "neces-
sary cost-cutting gesture in the face of tight budgetary con-
straints."" The court of appeals struck down this argument based
upon the clear rule that,
a general assertion that the average cost of employing older
workers as a group is higher than the average cost of employ-
ing younger workers as a group will not be recognized as a dif-
ferentiation under the terms and provisions of the Act, unless
one of the other statutory exceptions applies. To classify or
group employees solely on the basis of age for the purpose of
comparing costs, or for any other purpose, necessarily rests on
the assumption that the age factor alone may be used to jus-
tify a differentiation-an assumption plainly contrary to the
terms of the Act and the purpose of Congress in enacting it.
"Except in special situations and to the extent possible, teachers needed in West Hartford
next year will be recruited at levels below the sixth step of the salary schedule." Id.
Five plus years of experience, which Ms. Geller had, was required to achieve the sixth step
salary grade Id.
50. Id.
51. Geller, 635 F.2d at 1033.
52. Id.
53. Id. The court of appeals agreed with this finding. Id.
54. Id. at 1034.
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Differentials so based would serve only to perpetuate and
promote the very discrimination at which the Act is directed.55
The court concluded that the plaintiff established disparate im-
pact by proving that she was subjected to a facially neutral policy
disproportionately disadvantaging her as a member of a protected
class. 6 This case put into motion the erroneous rationale behind
holdings that apply disparate impact liability to actions under the
ADEA.
The Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit has also mistakenly
applied disparate impact liability to claims brought under the
ADEA. An example of this can be found in the court's rationale in
Smith v. City of Des Moines.5" In Smith, the plaintiff was a fire-
fighter of thirty-eight years, giving him a rank of fire captain
when he was dismissed.58 Six years prior to dismissal, the city
implemented annual testing of all firefighters at the rank of cap-
tain or below to determine whether they could safely fight fires
while wearing a self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA). 9 In
1988, 1992, and 1993, the plaintiff failed the annual testing re-
quired by the city." In January 1993, the fire department offered
to allow the plaintiff to remain on sick leave for four months, until
he turned fifty-five and would be eligible for retirement.61 After
the four months passed, the plaintiff did not file for retirement
and, in the interim, was examined by four physicians whom con-
cluded that he was physically capable of working as a firefighter.62
Subsequently, the plaintiff was not permitted to return to work,
but an offer was made by the fire department to place him on a
leave of absence with benefits until July 1, 1994, when he would
55. 29 C.F.R. § 860.103(h) (1979).
56. Geller, 635 F.2d at 1034.
57. 99 F.3d 1466.
58. Id. at 1468.
59. Id. "Each firefighter underwent spirometry testing, which gauges pulmonary func-
tion by measuring the capacity of lungs to exhale." Id. If a firefighter had a forced expira-
tory volume in one second (FEVI) that was less than 70%, the firefighter was then required
to take a maximum exercise stress test, which measures the capacity of the body to use
oxygen effectively. Id. In order to pass, a firefighter was required to establish a maximum
oxygen uptake (V02 max) of at least 33.5 milliliters per minute per kilogram of body
weight in order to pass the stress test. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Smith, 99 F.3d at 1468. Although Smith (plaintiff) did not file for retirement in
April, the fire chief filed an application for disability retirement on his behalf, which was
rejected by the pension board after they received recommendations that Smith was physi-
cally fit. Id.
Vol. 41
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be eligible for maximum pension benefits.63 In July, the plaintiff
did not file for retirement and the city discharged him shortly
thereafter for failing to meet physical fitness requirements.64 Af-
ter bringing suit alleging an ADEA violation, the district court
held that, even if it could be established that the testing had a
disparate impact on older firefighters, the city had established a
"business necessity" defense because firefighters require "a high
standard of physical fitness." 5
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld
the district court grant of summary judgment in favor of the de-
fendant.66 In doing so, the court noted the similarity between Title
VII and the ADEA, which was used as a basis in applying dispa-
rate impact to an ADEA claim.67 The court stated that, like Title
VII, the ADEA contains two prohibitions relevant to this case,
those being sections 623(a)(1) and (2).68 Based on the point of simi-
larity between the statutes, along with several previous holdings,
the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit concluded that dispa-
rate impact claims under the ADEA are cognizable.69
The Ninth Circuit further strengthened the side of the argu-
ment for applying disparate impact liability to claims under the
ADEA in E.E.O.C. v. Borden's Inc.7" In Borden's Inc., Borden ter-
minated 48 employees by closing their Phoenix, Arizona plant, and
16 of those employees fell within the protected class of the
ADEA.7' Under a policy of Borden, discharged employees were
entitled to severance pay, unless they were eligible for retirement
at the time of discharge.72 The Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) filed suit against Borden and two labor un-
ions that represented the discharged workers for age discrimina-
tion.73 The district court granted summary judgment for the
EEOC and held that the severance pay policy had a discrimina-
63. Id. at 1468.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1473.
67. Smith, 99 F.3d at 1470.
68. Smith, 99 F.3d at 1469. See supra text p. 4.
69. Id. at 1470. See also Houghton v. SIPCO, Inc., 38 F.3d 953 (8"h Cir. 1994); Nolting
v. Yellow Freight System Inc., 799 F.2d 1192 (8h Cir. 1986); Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe State
College, 702 F.2d 686 (8h Cir. 1983).
70. 724 F.2d 1390.
71. Id. at 1392.
72. Id. at 1391. Eligibility for retirement came at age 55 and after 10 years of service.
Id. at 1392.
73. Id at 1392..
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tory impact on older workers and was not a "bona fide employee
benefit plan" exempted from the ADEA.74
On appeal from Borden, the court of appeals affirmed the dis-
trict court's decision and held that disparate impact claims are
cognizable under the ADEA.5 The court determined, in opposition
to Borden's argument of inapplicability, that "[w]hile it is true
that the disparate impact theory first arose in cases under Title
VII ..., the similar language, structure, and purpose of Title VII
and the ADEA, as well as the similarity of the analytical problems
posed in interpreting the two statutes, has led us to adopt dispa-
rate impact in cases under the ADEA." 6 Once again, the similar-
ity in language of the ADEA and Title VII has erroneously led a
court to allow disparate impact liability in age discrimination
cases, which lies in direct conflict with the purpose of Congress in
enacting the ADEA.
In opposition to the faulty application of the theory of disparate
impact to the ADEA, the First, Third, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth
Circuits have questioned the viability of disparate impact analysis
when applied to age discrimination claims. These circuits have
relied heavily on the United States Supreme Court's opinions in
Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins.77 In Hazen Paper Co., respondent
filed suit against petitioners alleging a violation of the ADEA,
claiming that age was a determinative factor in his discharge."8 A
jury in the United States District Court for the District of Massa-
chusetts found that petitioners "willfully" violated the ADEA.9
The Court of Appeals, relying heavily on the evidence that the re-
spondent was fired to prevent his pension from vesting, affirmed
the judgment of the district court."0
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether inter-
fering with pension vesting violated the ADEA. In deciding this
question, the Court relied on the disparate treatment theory of
liability, in part because the Court had never decided whether
disparate impact liability was available under the ADEA, and the
74. Id.
75. Borden's Inc., 724 F.2d at 1394.
76. Id. at 1394.
77. 507 U.S. 604.
78. Id. at 606.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 607. "[The] evidence, as construed most favorably to respondent by the court,
showed that the Hazen Paper pension plan had a 10-year vesting period and that respon-
dent would have reached the 10-year mark had he worked 'a few more weeks' after being
fired." Id.
Vol. 41
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theory was not raised by respondent at trial.8 The Court recog-
nized that "[b]ecause age and years of service are analytically dis-
tinct, an employer can take account of one while ignoring the
other, and thus it is incorrect to say that a decision based on years
of service is necessarily 'age based'."82  Based on this, the Court
limited their holding to "an employer does not violate the ADEA
just by interfering with an employee's pension benefits that would
have vested by virtue of the employee's years of service." 3
Although this case dealt with disparate treatment, the concur-
ring opinion by Justice Kennedy addresses disparate impact. In
his concurrence, Justice Kennedy states that "nothing in the
Court's opinion should be read as incorporating in the ADEA con-
text the so-called 'disparate impact' theory of Title VII... and there
are substantial arguments that it is improper to carry over dispa-
rate impact analysis from Title VII to the ADEA."'4 This simple
statement has often supported the comprehensible and logical ra-
tionales of the circuit questioning the viability of disparate impact
liability under the ADEA.
This question of whether disparate impact liability should be al-
lowed under the ADEA was raised within the First Circuit in
Mullin v. Raytheon Company.85 In Mullin, the appellant was an
employee of Raytheon for twenty-nine years, whom had achieved a
labor grade of 15 on a scale ranging from 4 to 18.86 Beginning in
1984 and continuing until 1995, Raytheon continuously down-
graded appellant's job responsibilities, and ultimately decreased
his labor grade from 15 to 12.8' Following this period of demotion,
appellant brought suit alleging, inter alia, disparate impact liabil-
ity under the ADEA. After a period of discovery, the district court
81. Id. at 610.
82. Hazen Paper Co., 507 U.S. at 611.
83. Id. at 613.
84. Id. at 618 (Justice Kennedy, concurring.)
85. 164 F.3d 696.
86. Id. at 697. Raytheon assigns salaried employees a labor grade on a numeric scale
that ranges from 4 to 18, with each grade corresponding to a successively higher earnings
bracket. Id.
87. Id. at 698. In 1984, Raytheon transferred Mullin (appellant) to its Massachusetts
plant, where he became a second shift manager, supervising a mere 400 employees as com-
pared to his previous number of over 2000 subordinates. Id. In 1989, Mullin informally
became a troubleshooter and was transferred from area to area, according to need. Id. And




granted Raytheon motion for brevis disposition and the appeal
ensued."8
The court of appeals began their analysis of the disparate im-
pact claim by examining the statutory language of the ADEA .
The court stated that a "commonsense reading of [section
623(a)(1)] strongly suggests that the statute includes a require-
ment of intentional discrimination."" However, Title VII contains
parallel language, and the court noted that the Supreme Court
has held "such language encompasses a theory of liability based
on disparate impact."9
Relying on the majority and concurring opinions in Hazen Paper
Co.,92 the court recognized that "Congress passed the ADEA due to
'its concern that older workers were being deprived of employment
on the basis of inaccurate and stigmatizing stereotypes"' setting
the statute apart from Title VII, which was enacted "in an effort to
equalize employment opportunities for individuals whose em-
ployment prospects had been diminished by past discriminatory
practices."93 The protected classes under Title VII are immutable,
however the court remarked that
"[t]he aging process is inevitable, and Congress was not trying
to dissolve those naturally occurring relationships through
the medium of the ADEA, but, rather, aimed to protect older
workers against the disparate treatment that resulted from
stereotyping them as less productive and therefore less valu-
able members of the work force because of their advancing
years."94
Based on the classes protected and the purpose of Congress in en-
acting the ADEA, the court distinguished Griggs, and sets apart
the ADEA from Title VII.
Another crucial point to the court's analysis is its interpretation
of section 623(f)(1) of the ADEA. This section of the ADEA allows
employers to utilize reasonable factors other than age as grounds
for employment related decisions that disparately impact mem-
bers of the protected class. The court of appeals stated that
88. Id.
89. Id. at 700.
90. Mullin, 164 F.3d at 700.
91. Id. at 700. See Griggs, 401 U.S. 424 discussed supra pp. 8-9.
92. 507 U.S. 604.
93. Mullin, 164 F.3d at 700-01.
94. Id. at 701.
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"[w]hen this exception is read with the ADEA's general prohibition
against age-based discrimination, the resulting construction fol-
lows: it shall be unlawful to 'discriminate against any individual
... because of such individual's age,' except when 'based on ... fac-
tors other than age. '  If disparate impact liability is not pre-
cluded by section 623(f)(1), then, the court remarked, "such a cir-
cular construction would fly in the teeth of the well-settled cannon
that 'all words and provisions of statutes are intended to have
meaning and are to be given effect, and no construction should be
adopted which would render statutory words or phrases meaning-
less, redundant or superfluous.' 96 Therefore, the Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit held that the ADEA does not impose liability
under a theory of disparate impact.97
The Third Circuit has also formulated a rationale for denying
disparate impact liability under the ADEA. DiBiase v. Smithkline
Beecham Corporation" involved the scope of liability under the
ADEA. In DiBiase, the appellee (DiBiase) was terminated in a
RIF (Reduction in Force or lay-off), but was offered a separation
benefit plan, which could be enhanced by signing a general release
of all claims against Smithkline.99 DiBiase refused to sign the re-
lease and wrote a letter to the personnel director contending that
the policy violated the ADEA.'00 Subsequently, appellee filed suit
in district court alleging two counts of ADEA violations."' The
district court granted Smithkline's motion for summary judgment
in regards to count 1, but denied the motion in regards to count 2
and concluded that Smithkline's policy facially discriminates
against employees protected by the ADEA, and granted DiBiase's
cross-motion for summary judgment on count 2.102
95. Id. at 702.
96. Id. (quoting United States v. Ven-Fuel, Inc., 758 F.2d 741 (1" Cir. 1985)).
97. Id. at 703.
98. 48 F.3d 719 (3d Cir. 1995)
99. Id. at 722. "The separation benefit plan provided a lump sum payment based on
the employee's length of service, as well as continued health and dental benefits." Id. " The
enhanced plan entitled employees who signed the waiver to receive 15 months salary and
six months continued health and dental coverage." Id.
100. Id. at 723.
101. Id. "Count 1 asserted that Smithkline fired him because of his age, in violation of
the ADEA." Id. Count 2 alleged that Smithkline's "separation benefit plan violates the
ADEA because it discriminates against [him] and its other employees forty or older by
having higher requirements for them to qualify for the additional separation benefits than
apply to its employees under forty." Id.
102. Id. at 724. The district court observed that the policy facially discriminated be-
cause "in order for an older employee to receive the same enhanced benefit as a younger
employee, the older employee must release her right to file an ADEA claim" and "this
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On appeal of the grant of summary judgment in favor of DiBi-
ase, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit was called upon,
inter alia, to determine whether disparate impact is a viable the-
ory of liability in an ADEA case. The court began their analysis of
this question by relying on the Supreme Court's reasoning in
Hazen Paper Co., to cast considerable doubt on the viability of the
theory of disparate impact under the ADEA. °3 Although this
court held previously that disparate impact is cognizable under
Title VII and the ADEA,"' the court of appeals acknowledged that
the statement about the ADEA was pure dicta and the case was
decided pre-Hazen.'° Furthermore, the court noted that "Con-
gress' promulgation of the ADEA was prompted by its concern
that older workers were being deprived of employment on the ba-
sis of inaccurate and stigmatizing stereotypes, [and] when the
employer's decision is wholly motivated by factors other than age,
the problem of inaccurate and stigmatizing stereotypes disap-
pears."1°6 One can read this statement to eliminate disparate im-
pact claims under the ADEA because, to read otherwise, would fly
in the face of the "reasonable factors other than age" defense enu-
merated in section 623 (f)(1).
To strengthen the argument further, the court deconstructed
the grammar of section 623 (a)(2), which has been interpreted to
allow disparate impact claims. °7 In order to find disparate impact
within this section, the language "because of such individual's age"
must be read to modify "adversely affect" rather than to modify
"limit, segregate, or classify", which, based on the placement of the
commas, is a grammatically incorrect reading.' 8
Finally, the court of appeals contrasted the purpose behind Title
VII, which was to remedy past discrimination of the protected
classes, and the ADEA, which was to prohibit employers from act-
ing upon the assumption that "productivity and competence de-
clined with age."0 9 In doing so, the court discussed Congress' rec-
treatment in patently different because the younger employee cannot have an ADEA
claim". Id.
103. DiBiase, 48 F.3d at 732.
104. Id. at 732-33McNamara v. Korean Air Lines, 863 F.2d 1135, 1148 (3"' Cir. 1988).
105. Id at 733.
106. Id. at 733. (quoting Hazen Paper Co., 113 S.Ct. at 1706).
107. Id. This section renders it "unlawful for an employer to limit, segregate, or classify
his employees in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of em-
ployment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's age." Id.
108. DiBiase,48 F.3d at 733..
109. Id. at 734.
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ognition of the distinction, and found that the "reasonable factor
other than age" defense was Congress' way of prohibiting dispa-
rate treatment and authorizing disparate impact under the
ADEA.110 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit bolstered the
argument for precluding disparate impact liability under the
ADEA, by peering into the statutory language and set forth the
only comprehensible interpretation of the ADEA.
Along with the First and Third Circuits, the Sixth, Seventh, and
Tenth Circuits have all sided with the argument of precluding
disparate impact liability under the ADEA.
In Lyon v. Ohio Education Association,11' the Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of the defendants, based on the plaintiffs inabil-
ity to set forth a prima facie case of age discrimination."' In decid-
ing whether a claim of disparate impact is cognizable under the
ADEA, the court recognized, relying on Hazen Paper Co., that an
employer has not violated the ADEA when motivated by a factor
other than age in an employment decision."3 The court stated that
"[t]he ADEA was not intended to protect older workers from the
often harsh economic realities of common business decisions and
the hardships associated with corporate reorganizations, downsiz-
ing, plant closings and relocations," and therefore, "plaintiffs must
allege that the [defendant] discriminated against them because
they were old, not because they were expensive, or any other rea-
son unrelated to age.11 4
The Seventh Circuit has also depended on the holding in Hazen
Paper Co. to question the viability of disparate impact under the
ADEA. In EEOC v. Francis W. Parker School,"5 the Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit challenged the disparate impact the-
ory of liability when applied under the ADEA. Once again relying
110. Id. at 734.
111. 53 F.3d 135 (6h Cir. 1995). In this case, the plaintiffs alleged that an early retire-
ment provision in their collective bargaining agreement between the defendants violated
the ADEA. Id. at 136. The suit centered around "Option B" of their early retirement plan,
which states in pertinent part, "[e]arly retirement benefits under this Option B shall be at
least equal to the same percent of salary that the participant would have received if the
participant had retired on the normal retirement date." Id. Plaintiffs claimed that this
clause violated the ADEA because "younger persons who take an early retirement receive a
higher pension amount than older persons taking a retirement with the same length of
service." Id.
112. Id. at 140.
113. Id. at 137.
114. Id. It 139 (quoting Allen v. Diebold, Inc., 33 f.3d 674, 676-77 (6h Cir. 1994)).
115. 41 F.3d 1073 (7"h Cir 1994).
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on the Supreme Court's holding in Hazen Paper Co., the court ex-
pressed distaste for the disparate impact theory. In this case, the
defendant needed to hire a new drama teacher, but because of fis-
cal restraints, the new teacher's salary would be no more than
$28,000.11' Incumbent teachers' salaries were determined on a
twenty-two step salary scale, linking salary to work experience."7
The EEOC filed suit claiming "that due to the statistically signifi-
cant relationship between age and work experience, by setting a
maximum salary limit, Parker excluded a disproportionate per-
centage of applicants over age forty from consideration for the
teaching position.""'
In considering the EEOC's claim of disparate impact, the court
relied on the critical holding in Hazen Paper Co., and found that
"[t]he Court's discussion makes clear that the ADEA prevents em-
ployers from using age as a criterion for employment decisions.
On the other hand, decisions based on criterion which merely tend
to affect workers over age forty more adversely than workers un-
der forty are not prohibited."'1 9 The court of appeals further noted
that "[section 623 (f)(1)] suggests that decisions which are made
for reasons independent of age but which happen to correlate with
age are not actionable under the ADEA."'2
Depending less on Hazen Paper Co., and more on the statutory
language and legislative intent of the ADEA, the Tenth Circuit
has also doubted the application of disparate impact liability to
age discrimination claims. In Ellis v. United Airlines, Inc., 21 the.
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that disparate impact
claims under the ADEA were not cognizable. In Ellis, plaintiffs
(Ellis and Wong-Larkin) were two women denied employment by
United Airlines for failure to meet the standard weight require-
ments for flight attendants.1 22 Ellis was forty years old when she
was first denied employment and Wong-Larkin was age forty
when she was denied employment for the second time.' 23 United
116. Id. at 1075.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1077.
120. Francis W. Parker, 41 F.3d at 1077.
121. 73 F.3d 999 (10'" Cir. 1996).
122. Id. at 1001. United employed two separate weight standards, one in which an
initial weight limit must be met for new applicants, and the second standard establishes
maximum weight limits that cannot be exceeded by flight attendants after they are hired.
123. Id. at 1001-02.
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asserted that both women were not hired because of their
weight.24 Plaintiffs subsequently filed suit alleging age discrimi-
nation in violation of the ADEA when United refused to hire them
as flight attendants.12'5 The argument plaintiffs alleged pertinent
to this discussion was that "United's use of age-neutral weight
requirements for hiring, even if not motivated by a discriminatory
animus against age, disparately impacted them because of their
age.,126
In addressing the argument of disparate impact and affirming
the district court's grant of summary judgment for United on that
ground, the court of appeals began their analysis with the inter-
pretation of the text of the ADEA.12' The most obvious reading of
section 623(a)(1), the court states, is that it prohibits intentional
discrimination by employers based on a person's age. 28 The court
recognized that "[i]t would be a stretch to read the phrase 'because
of such individual's age' to prohibit incidental and unintentional
discrimination (disparate impact) that resulted because of em-
ployment decisions which were made for reasons other than
age. ,29
To further reinforce the denial of disparate impact claims under
the ADEA, the court explained, "the legislative history of the
ADEA suggests that it was not enacted to address disparate im-
pact claims." 3° The ADEA was enacted in large part based upon a
report by the secretary of labor that differentiated between inten-
tional "arbitrary discrimination" and problems stemming from
factors that "affect older workers more strongly, as a group, than
they do younger employees.""'1 The court observed that "[t]he re-
port then recommended that Congress prohibit 'arbitrary dis-
crimination,' but that factors which 'affect older workers' be ad-
dressed through programmatic measures to improve opportunities
for older workers".' The court of appeals is stating the most logi-
cal conclusion that the purpose of the ADEA was to prevent dispa-
rate treatment, not disparate impact.
124. Id. at 1002.
125. Id. at 1003.
126. Ellis, 73 F.3d at 1003.
127. Id. at 1007.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1008.




Although there are persuasive arguments on both sides of this
issue, the dominating argument precludes disparate impact liabil-
ity from age discrimination claims. First and foremost, the text on
the ADEA must be read to prohibit disparate treatment, and noth-
ing more. The words "because of such individual's age" scream
intent. To read this statute to also prohibit unintentional age dis-
crimination would confuse all senses of logic.
Despite that logic, the language of Title VII parallels that of the
ADEA, and disparate impact liability has been applied to Title VII
actions by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co..33
However, the ADEA was enacted before Griggs, and to apply the
holding in Griggs literally, to the ADEA would make no logical
sense. Title VII protects "suspect" classes, with the possible ex-
ception of religion, where age is a class in which everyone moves
into. The application of disparate impact liability to Title VII ac-
tions, and those actions alone, allows the prevention of discrimi-
nation of "suspect" classes, because these classes have a history of
unintentional discriminatory practice employed against them.
The legislative intent of the Congress in enacting the ADEA was
to prohibit "arbitrary age discrimination", i.e. intentional age dis-
crimination."' If Congress intended to prohibit unintentional age
discrimination, the ADEA would read "because of, or in relation to,
such individual's age." That is not what Congress intended to
prohibit, therefore the statute only prohibits intentional discrimi-
nation.
In bolstering this argument, Justice Kennedy stated in Hazen
Paper Co., that "nothing in the Court's opinion should be read as
incorporating in the ADEA context the so-called 'disparate impact'
theory of Title VII.. .and there are substantial arguments that it is
improper to carry over disparate impact analysis from Title VII to
the ADEA."'35 The First, Third, Sixth, Seventh and Tenth Circuits
were all correct when they found that it did not make sense to ap-
ply disparate impact liability to the ADEA, and held that dispa-
rate impact claims under the ADEA are not cognizable. Any hold-
ing to the contrary lacks a rational interpretation of the ADEA.
Another intricate piece of the argument is section 623(f)(1), the
"reasonable factors other than age" defense. By placing this de-
fense within the ADEA, Congress precluded a claim of disparate
133. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
134. Ellis, 73 F.3d at 1009.
135. 507 U.S. at 618 (Justice Kennedy, concurring.)
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impact. If disparate impact claims are permitted under the
ADEA, section 623(f)(1) becomes useless. Business decisions that
disparately impact older employees are based on reasonable fac-
tors other than age, because if not, the decision would be based on
the person's age, qualifying as disparate treatment in violation of
the ADEA.
In today's business world, companies should be allowed to em-
ploy business decisions, when not motivated by age, but that inad-
vertently affect older workers. By allowing disparate impact
claims to move forward, the entrepreneurs of society will be dis-
couraged from making these business decisions crucial to a flour-
ishing economy. The business world will fall prey to the whims of
the judges and juries, and what they determine is reasonable.
Entrepreneurs do not tell judges how to run their courtrooms, and
judges should be obligated to offer the same respect to entrepre-
neurs. The courts should give great deference to the business
judgment of employers, and only punish those decisions that were
made based on a person's age.
On April 1, 2002, the Supreme Court dismissed their writ of cer-
tiorari as improvidently granted in Adams v. Florida Power Cor-
poration. 136 Unfortunately, the issue of whether disparate impact
liability should be applied under the ADEA will be left undecided,
for the time being, by the Supreme Court. However, I respectfully
submit that when this issue appears before the Court again, the
only logical conclusion that can be reached is to preclude disparate
impact liability from age discrimination claims under the ADEA.
Rocco Cozza
136. 2002 U.S. LEXIS 2339
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